

# Charting the Path to Success

How to prepare lead turnaround partners to meet the challenges of chronically failing schools

# Roadmap

- The promise of the Lead Turnaround Partner (LTP) model for failing schools
- The story of three successful schools: distinguishing turnaround from high-performing, high-poverty schools
- Lessons from a growing field: building an effective LTP
- Opportunities for expanding the supply of LTPs in Washington, DC.

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# What is turnaround?

School turnaround is a sustained, substantive effort to rapidly improve a persistently failing school's academic outcomes – without changing the demographic make-up of its student body.

Turnaround could include:

- Replacing some or all current school staff.
- Intensive re-training and support of existing staff.
- Turning over the school to a nonprofit organization.

# A record of failure

Mass Insight – the leading researcher on turnaround – has conducted a national review of successful examples and failed attempts in the field. Unfortunately, the failures dramatically outnumber the successes.

Their research suggests that districts typically tinker around the edges, attempting “light-touch” turnaround efforts that fall short, including:

- Layering overlapping, uncoordinated school partnerships
- Requiring additional improvement plans, which only become documents gathering dust on an office shelf
- Sending in external improvement teams to complete two-week superficial consultations
- Hiring retired school administrators - who may lack established expertise - to provide coaching to a large number of schools for only a few hours each month

# Diagnosing failure

Mass Insight has concluded that such efforts often fail due to the following shortcomings:

- **Inadequate design:** Uncoordinated, shallow efforts don't match the deep and complex needs of a failing school
- **Inadequate capacity:** Districts implement fragmented training initiatives, instead of a comprehensive human capital strategy
- **Inadequate incentive change:** Decisions are driven more by compliance than buy-in and strategy
- **Inadequate political will:** Districts focus on program reforms that are politically safe rather than systemic reforms that are more controversial (e.g., governance, budget control)


# The promise of the Lead Turnaround Partner (LTP) model

Learning from the common traits of the few efforts that *have* been successful in turning around *multiple* schools, Mass Insight has designed a framework for organizations it calls “lead turnaround partners” (LTPs).

*“Lead Turnaround Partners are non-profit organizations... on contract with the district central office or state to turn around schools.”*

## Key Features of LTPs:

- **Accountability** for student achievement through a multi-year performance contract
- **Autonomy** over the majority of management decisions, including hiring/supervising the principal and other staff in the building
- **Control** over programs, including academic model student support services.



# LTPs: Designed for success

## The shortcomings of past efforts

**Inadequate design:** Uncoordinated, shallow efforts don't match the deep and complex needs of a failing school

**Inadequate capacity:** Districts implement fragmented training initiatives, instead of a comprehensive human capital strategy

**Inadequate incentive change:** Decisions are driven more by compliance than strategy

**Inadequate political will:** Districts focus on program reforms that are politically safe rather than systemic reforms that are more controversial (e.g., governance, budget control)

## Key facets of the LTP model

**Embedded management:** LTP staff are embedded in the school and coordinate all external partnerships to ensure alignment

**Deep capacity:** LTPs specialize in turnaround and commit all their resources to a small cohort of schools, managing all staff in the building.

**Focus on the bottom line:** LTPs are held accountable for student achievement, with district contracts hinging on performance gains

**Freedom to make tough, but necessary decisions:** LTPs are granted the "four freedoms" over budget, program, people and time, empowering them to make the decisions necessary to drive student achievement

# The “Four Freedoms”

In order for LTPs to be successful, districts should grant them the following freedoms:

- *People:* Freedom to choose teachers and staff
- *Program:* Freedom to choose academic program and interventions
- *Time:* Freedom to use time as needed
- *Budget:* Freedom to use school funds in support of improvement strategy

Unless the right conditions are in place for LTPs, efforts will be slow and subject to rapid reversal.

# Two national proof points

Two LTPs with a track record of success in turnaround have emerged as national models in the field:


- Mastery Charter Schools, Philadelphia
- Academy of Urban School Leadership, Chicago



These two organizations served as key case studies in our research. As the two cities that have proven effective environments for successful LTPs, Philadelphia and Chicago are worth a closer look to better understand the turnaround landscape.

# National market for turnaround: A dearth of supply amid overwhelming demand

According to the standards set by No Child Left Behind, over 4580 schools were “failing” in the 2008-2009 school year. Even in two cities that are far along the learning curve – Chicago and Philadelphia – LTPs are few and far between. Our home city of DC fares no better.




\* “Failing Schools” are defined in this figure as all schools that have failed to meet AYP for 5 years in a row.

# Roadmap


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# A School-Level Perspective of Mastery and AUSL

Mastery's Pickett campus  
Taken over in 2007




AUSL's Harvard School of Excellence  
Taken over in 2007




# Catching up with high-poverty, high-performing schools

KIPP DC: KEY Academy, based in DC, is among a group of high-poverty, high-performing schools that sets the standard for consistently educating low-income students. Both Mastery and AUSL seek to transform failing schools into such high-poverty, high-performing schools.


**KIPP DC:  
KEY Academy**



**Mastery Charter Schools:  
Pickett Campus**



**AUSL:  
Harvard School of Excellence**



\* Note: Philly average does not include the charter sector

## A closer look at three model schools\*

	KIPP DC: KEY Academy	Mastery Charter Schools: Pickett Campus	AUSL: Harvard School of Excellence
Year Founded	2001	Turnaround Launched 2007	Turnaround Launched 2007
Location	Washington, DC	Philadelphia	Chicago
Grades Served	5-8	7-10**	K-8
Approx. Student Enrollment	328	455	517
% African-American	99%	99%	99%
% FRPL	78%	91%	97%
% Special Education	10%	22%	9%

\* All statistics from the 2008-2009 school year.

\*\* When Pickett became a turnaround school, it served only grades 7 and 8. Growing a grade each year, it will reach full capacity at 670 students (grades 7 through 12) in 2011-12.

# Challenges faced in both turnaround and high-poverty, high-performing schools

To successfully serve low-income students, operators like KIPP must initially confront many of the same challenges – surrounding student body, operations and school management – as LTPs like Mastery and AUSL.

## Student body

**Low academic skills:** incoming students typically perform significantly behind grade level in math and/or reading, often by one or more years.

**Poor behavioral norms:** incoming students are unaccustomed to a “high expectations, no excuses” culture.

## Operations

**Absent or inefficient operational systems:** all schools need to develop effective ways of managing non-instructional services including facilities, transportation, food services, etc.

## School management

**Heavy demands on the school leadership team:** all schools need to identify management systems that can handle the complexity of simultaneously improving student achievement, establishing a school culture of high expectations, and operating the school efficiently.

# Challenges unique to LTPs

But compared to high-poverty, high-performing schools, LTPs encounter conditions that heighten the challenges in turning around failing schools:

## Turnaround Context

### Student Body

- Whole-school takeover: typically, turnaround addresses all grades at once, rather than one grade at a time
- Little buy-in from students: neighborhood students do not select in, but are automatically enrolled

### Operations

- District contract: LTP autonomies are negotiated and coordinated with the district

### School Management

- Turnaround complexity and scale (whole school takeover): the above sets of conditions and challenges increase the demands placed on the LTP and school

## Resulting Challenges

The entire student body, not just incoming students, requires academic remediation  
Disillusioned with school and accustomed to failure, a greater number of students resist cultural change

Added bureaucracy encumbers LTPs as they navigate district systems and attempt to exercise promised autonomies

LTPs struggle to find the leadership expertise and capacity to effectively cope with overwhelming demands

# Distinguishing actions of turnaround schools: Two case studies

Because of the additional challenges they face, Mastery: Pickett and AUSL: Harvard are taking different paths to excellence than KIPP DC: KEY. A close comparison of these three schools illustrates exactly where those paths diverge.

## **Case Study 1**

*Mastery: Pickett and KIPP DC: KEY*

Producing the most impressive student test score gains of any LTP, Mastery's prescriptive and targeted approach to the challenges of the student body and school management sets it apart from other high-poverty, high-performing schools.

## **Case Study 2**

*AUSL: Harvard and KIPP DC: KEY*

In its contract with Chicago Public Schools, AUSL faces operational challenges that Mastery does not. As such, AUSL models a hybrid relationship typical of most (but not all) LTPs.

# Distinguishing actions of turnaround schools

## KIPP DC: KEY vs. Mastery: Pickett Campus

	KIPP DC: KEY Academy	Mastery: Pickett Campus
<b>Academic Instruction</b>	Focus on remediation for entering students; broad college prep curriculum is the norm in later years.	Heavy focus on remediation for <i>most</i> students; narrow college prep curriculum only for those with requisite skills.
	Student achievement is a driving factor in decisions to retain teachers; pay is not directly linked to individual teacher performance.	Four-tiered performance pay system is a means of intensifying focus on academic performance.
<b>School Culture</b>	Teachers and school leaders discuss behavior and climate on a regular but informal basis.	Comprehensive, centralized data system collects and tracks behavior and climate metrics on a rigorous bi-weekly basis. Leadership formally reviews data at the same pace.
	Behavioral model focuses on “sweating the small stuff.”	Behavioral model goes further, prescribing responses to violent/destructive behavior.
	Social and emotional learning is reinforced informally as part of daily routine.	Social and emotional learning is made explicit through twice-weekly classes covering specific grade-level curricula.
	School culture is a priority for all, but not the sole responsibility of additional designated staff.	School Culture Team is staffed by four plus FTEs, including a designated Assistant Principal and Dean of Students.
<b>School Management</b>	Principal is given significant autonomy over school management, in coordination with KIPP DC Headquarters.	Principal is tightly managed by the central office.
	Leadership team of three: one principal and two assistant principals who are each responsible for a range of intentionally coordinated duties.	Leadership team of five: one principal and four assistant principals who each specialize in one specific area of work.

# Distinguishing actions of turnaround schools

## KIPP DC: KEY vs. AUSL: Harvard

	KIPP DC: KEY Academy	AUSL: Harvard School of Excellence
<b>Facilities</b>	Relies on own headquarters staff to secure and maintain quality facilities	Oversees and supplements district facility renovation; contacts central office with maintenance issues
<b>Non-Instructional Services</b>	Relies on own headquarters staff to coordinate all services	Navigates district bureaucracy to coordinate services and troubleshoot issues
<b>Human Resources</b>	Relies on own headquarters staff to set and implement HR practices.	Coordinates and negotiates with district HR office for exemptions to standard district practice

# From challenges to actions: The bottom line for LTPs

## Challenges

### **Student Body:**

Low behavioral expectations and limited academic skills inhibit student progress

### **Operations:**

Added bureaucracy encumbers LTPs

### **School Management:**

Demands of turnaround can overwhelm LTPs

## Responses

Narrow college prep curriculum with a special focus on remediation

Intense focus on conflict management, with additional resources to reset culture across the building

Focus on building relationships within the district and learning its systems

Resistance to district actions that may jeopardize autonomies

Centralized and prescriptive leadership structures

Abundance of school leadership staff members, each with specialized skills and duties

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# CityBridge Research: Snapshot of a growing field

## *Turnaround is a young field.*

The number of LTPs even interested in beginning this work is dwarfed by the number of failing schools in need of intervention. Because there are so few proof points, the field has yet to fully understand what makes for a successful lead turnaround partner.

## *Turnaround is a growing field.*

From Chicago to Los Angeles to Washington DC, organizations are answering the call to turn around the lowest-performing urban schools, though more are needed.

## *And we can make it grow faster.*

In order to develop the market of providers, we need to know both how to support the development of new lead turnaround partners and increase the capacity of those already working successfully. In search of that knowledge, CityBridge studied ten lead turnaround partners operating in eight different cities across the country.



# CityBridge research: A study of 10 lead turnaround partners

Turnaround Operator	CEO	Cities of Operation	Year of First Turnaround	# Turnaround Schools
Mastery Charter Schools	Scott Gordon	Philadelphia	2005	6
FirstLine Schools	Jay Altman	New Orleans	2005	2
Academy for Urban School Leadership (AUSL)	Don Feinstein	Chicago	2006	13
Green Dot Public Schools	Marco Petruzzi	Los Angeles	2008	1*
Friends of Bedford	George Leonard	DC	2009	1
Friendship PCS	Donald Hense	Baltimore, DC	2009	2
ReNEW	Gary Robichaux	New Orleans	2010	2
Scholar Academies	Lars Beck	Philadelphia, DC	2010	2
Domus	Mike Duggan	Stamford, New Haven	2010	1
Unlocking Potential (UP)	Scott Given	Boston	2011	1

\* Green Dot took over a single large school, Locke Senior High School, which now operates as eight smaller academies.

# CityBridge research: A framework for building LTPs

In order to help build LTPs equipped for success, an incubator needs to know how effective LTPs are organized. To begin our research, we identified a few key questions to consider when preparing an LTP for school turnaround:

1. What qualities and experiences make for an effective LTP leader?
2. What key central office directors are needed to support the LTP leader?
3. What is an appropriate timeline for LTP incubation?

# 1. Identifying the LTP leader

## No 'standard' resume for turnaround leadership



### **Scott Gordon**

#### **Mastery Charter Schools**

- Earned an MBA from Yale University and began career at General Foods Corporation
- Founded Home Care Associates, a worker-owned home health-care company
- Became founder and CEO of Mastery, operating six turnarounds in 2010



### **Darius Adamson**

#### **Academy of Urban School Leadership (AUSL)**

- Earned a master's degree in education administration from University of South Carolina
- Produced significant student achievement gains as principal of a failing Charlotte-Mecklenburg school
- Served as ED of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Achievement Zone for two years, before becoming director of high school turnaround for AUSL in Chicago

# 1. Identifying the LTP leader

## Pathways to effective leadership

The CEOs of lead turnaround partners tend to consistently demonstrate a strong and successful history of prior organizational leadership. This history of successful leadership might not be limited to the education sphere: the individuals we interviewed evenly represent experience in both the education (ex: Darius Adamson) and the business sector (ex: Scott Gordon). To a certain extent, experience launching and managing a business may substitute for school leadership.


### *Pathway One: Leadership in School Administration*

- 5 of 10 LTPs studied are run by former school principals with experience working in high-poverty urban schools.



### *Pathway Two: Leadership in Business Management*

- All 5 non-principals had experience launching and/or managing an organization, 3 in the for-profit and 2 in the non-profit sector.
- Before running an LTP, 4 leaders had significant experience (at least 4 years) as executive directors of CMOs. The fifth served actively in his CMO's central office and on its Board of Directors.



# 1. Identifying the LTP leader

## Key action patterns for turnaround leadership

Public Impact, a national education think tank, has identified fourteen critical action patterns for turnaround leaders across sectors. Turnaround leaders consistently demonstrate these action patterns in their approaches to reforming failing schools – regardless of whether they come from a traditional education or business management background. Public Impact highlights three such action patterns that we believe are particularly key to success:

Pattern of Action	Definition	Example: Scott Gordon, Mastery Charter Schools
<b>Breaks Rules and Norms</b>	Disregards the status quo, balking failed rules and routines in favor of strategies that work	Implemented a tiered performance pay system that ranks teachers based on student academic achievement
<b>Makes Early Wins</b>	Establishes early focus on achieving a few high-priority changes with big payoffs, then leverages success to gain buy-in and momentum	Quickly established a calmer learning environment through clear behavioral and instructional standards
<b>Experiments with New Tactics</b>	Rapidly cycles through tactics to determine what works, measuring results and immediately replacing failed or low-impact strategies	After identifying the need for a clear scope and sequence in first year of turnaround, took steps to build one out for the following year

## 2. Building a Central Office Team Gary Robichaux and ReNEW




Just over a year ago in New Orleans, former teacher, KIPP principal, and Recovery School District executive Gary Robichaux began building a new charter management organization devoted to turning around failing schools. As executive director of ReNEW, Gary is operating two district middle schools this year and plans to turn around two more schools per year for the next five years, ultimately reaching 5000 New Orleans students.

The story of ReNEW's incubation provides fresh insight into how to think about building and staffing a new LTP.

## 2. Building a Central Office Team

### Case Study of ReNEW Charter Management Organization

Over the course of a year, Gary built out a central office team of 9 directors resembling the central office at Mastery. However, he made three key early hires (in **bold**) based on the central role that they would play during incubation.



## 2. Building the Central Office Team

### Motivations for building an extensive staff

*The scale of turnaround:* Unlike starting a charter school, which typically involves building up the student body grade by grade, turnaround entails whole-scale takeover of multiple existing grades. The sheer size of the takeover calls for a central office staff with distributed leadership, large enough to cover all necessary duties.

*The need for tight management:* A capacity for extensive centralized administration is one of the keys to Mastery's success, allowing rapid implementation of changes and ensuring that school-level management does not slow progress.


*The need to build capacity:* An extensive central office staff with distributed leadership allows an LTP to grow to multiple schools while still ensuring consistent management across the network.

## 2. Building a Central Office Team Lessons from Mastery and ReNEW

### *“The Rule of Four”*

The central office directors at both Mastery and ReNEW take on responsibilities that span four major areas of work: academics, operations, data, and human capital (anecdotal evidence suggests that community engagement is a fifth category of responsibility, though this work may be delegated to a school-level individual during start-up phase).

We recommend that a new LTP CEO build a central office team with expertise covering these four key areas. One possible team structure is reflected in the staffing model at left, although the number of hires will vary depending on the skills the CEO already brings to the table. As the organization incubates and launches its first turnaround school, additional central office support may be added.



## 2. Building a Central Office Team

### Duties of key directors



#### Chief Academic Officer

##### Incubation Year

Helps to build out curriculum and instructional model  
On-boards and trains school principal  
Leads summer professional development for teachers

##### Academic Year

Evaluates teacher and principal performance  
Manages professional development  
Provides on-site instructional support



#### Chief Operations Officer

##### Incubation Year

Oversees facilities renovations  
Organizes non-instructional services: transportation, food services, payroll, uniform distribution, etc.  
Manages sources and flow of received funding

##### Academic Year

Oversees facilities and provides day-to-day operational support  
Continues to manage non-instructional services  
Finances operations; manages use of school budgets  
Completes financial reports



#### Director of Data/Assessment

##### Incubation Year

Becomes familiar with district data system and key district staff  
Acquires new assessment tools if necessary (ex: A-Net)  
Gathers and analyzes available data on incoming student achievement levels

##### Academic Year

Manages data dashboard  
Trains and supports teachers/principals in use of data  
Maintains relationships with key district staff



#### Director of Human Capital

##### Incubation Year


Manages recruitment process; handles all applications  
Oversees interviewing and hiring of all school staff

##### Academic Year

Identifies need for additional staff and hires individuals to fill those position  
Manages payroll, including performance rewards if applicable

# 3. The Incubation Timeline


## Building the ReNEW team and model



\* Both new directors worked in human resources only for the duration of incubation, and assumed other official duties during the school year.

# 3. The Incubation Timeline

## Preparing to launch two ReNEW schools




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# DC demand for turnaround

Across all DCPS and charter schools, 16 schools scored below the city average in *both* math and reading on the DC CAS for *each* of the last 4 years.\*







\* Original graph from FOCUS. These figures exclude alternative and special education schools, and any schools that do not have 4 years of test scores to report. For the purposes of this figure, only schools performing at least 10 points below the average in both math and reading were counted as “below the city average.” This choice represents CityBridge’s methodology for analyzing the data, and does not preclude other approaches to defining ‘failing schools.’

# The legacy of failure

These 16 chronically under-performing DC schools:













- Scored an average of 20% proficient in math and 18% proficient in reading on the 2010 DC CAS, well below the city average
- Made meager – if any – performance gains across the last 4 years
- Collectively failed to educate almost 8000 students – roughly one in ten DC students – in the 2009-2010 school year alone

# Ensuring an environment for success: Rubric for Assessing LTP Autonomies

	People	Program	Time	Money
	<i>Includes decisions on hiring and firing, compensation, evaluation, promotion, and staffing structure</i>	<i>Includes decisions on curriculum, school culture, academic/behavioral interventions, extracurricular programs, and external partners</i>	<i>Includes decisions on scheduling, extended day and year, professional development hours, and common planning time</i>	<i>Includes the quantity of funding and decisions on allocation of funding and procurement.</i>
	LTP has complete authority over all areas.	LTP has complete authority over all areas.	LTP has complete authority over all areas.	LTP has sufficient additional funds, and complete authority over allocation and procurement.
	LTP has authority over the majority of areas, but must adhere to CBA regulations.	LTP has authority over the majority of areas, but may be required to implement some district-mandated policies.	LTP has some, but not full, autonomy in all areas.	LTP has sufficient additional funds, with authority over allocation and procurement in all areas other than back office services.
	LTP has authority over some areas, but process for securing waivers from CBA or acting on guaranteed autonomy is arduous.	LTP has authority over some areas, but is required to implement several district-mandated policies/programs.	LTP has limited authority to extend school day/year, but has flexibility in all other areas.	LTP has limited additional funds, with authority over allocation and procurement in all areas other than back office services.
	LTP has authority over few areas, and is highly restrained by inflexible CBA.	LTP has little authority over any of these areas.	LTP has limited or no authority to extend school day/year, but may have flexibility in other areas.	LTP has insufficient additional funds, with little authority over allocation and challenging procurement processes.

# Ensuring an environment for success:

How do districts compare in offering LTPs the “four freedoms”?

	People	Program	Time	Money
<b>Philadelphia:</b> Mastery				
<b>Chicago:</b> AUSL				
<b>DC:</b> Scholar Academies				

Given AUSL’s success in Chicago, full autonomy in all areas may not be necessary for success, but some degree certainly is. Are DC’s minimal conditions enough for turnaround to be successful?

# A side-by-side comparison

## Chicago

People: Staff are subject to CBA, though operators can apply for waivers and benefit from additional staffing positions.

Program: Operators receive full program autonomy.

Time: Provide additional instructional and planning time, though staff time must be funded through private dollars.

Budget: Operators receive full discretion over entire budget, except back office services.

## DC

People: Staff are subject to CBA, though under-performers can be moved out through new contract.

Program: Operators receive full autonomy, but limited in practice by little budgetary discretion

Time: Extended day and extended year granted to operators, but with required staff consent that most schools haven't gained.

Budget: Operators only receive discretion over \$700-900 per student turnaround premium.

Though LTPs in DC have less autonomy in most areas, the power DC operators have to move out low-performing staff is perhaps the most valuable lever.

# Paths to expanding LTP supply

## 1) Incubate new LTP

### Pros

- Can design organization from scratch to fit the DC landscape
- Expands and diversifies the portfolio of LTPs in DC

### Cons

- Longer timeline to launch and more expensive
- May be difficult to find the right leader with turnaround expertise
- Without a proven record, investment is riskier

## 2) Transplant established LTP

### Pros

- Already have expertise and proven model in place
- Easy to sell track record to DCPS

### Cons

- May be difficult to sell LTP on the DC environment (limited freedoms and new political climate)
- Have to adapt to DC context

## 3) Scale current DC-based LTP

### Pros

- Already have systems in place for DC and understand local terrain
- Have established relationships in DC, allowing for quicker implementation

### Cons

- Depends on appetite and capacity for growth
- May not have proven track record yet

# A framework for investment decisions: Revisiting key findings

- *Best practices in turnaround are already emerging.* Though a young field, turnaround has proof points – most notably, Mastery – that should be carefully studied to raise our prospects of success.
- *There are identifiable patterns to great turnaround leadership.* Public Impact has isolated the action patterns of effective turnaround leaders, and our research suggests a few ‘experience indicators’ that can begin to guide a search for the right leader.
- *Effective LTPs are organized to respond to the conditions of turnaround.* The added challenges of turnaround require additional central office capacity. LTPs should consider hiring specific staff to specialize in instruction, data, human capital and operations.
- *New LTPs do not develop overnight.* Incubating a new LTP is time intensive, requiring at least 14 months once the right leader is in place. Scaling or transplanting an existing LTP is a faster alternative.

# A CityBridge investment: Scaling Scholar Academies in DC

Scholar Academies, a Philadelphia-based LTP which took over its first DC turnaround school in August 2010, has many of the ingredients for success. Already, CEO Lars Beck has:

- ✓ **Gained a practical knowledge of the field:** Lars has developed a comprehensive school turnaround model, to which this first year in DC will add a deeper understanding of what works on the ground.
- ✓ **Capitalized on his access to best practices:** Lars recognizes Mastery as a model for effective school turnaround and understand the strategies that have made it successful.
- ✓ **Become familiar with the turnaround landscape in DC:** Lars is committed to working in DC, where he is already building relationships and learning to navigate district systems.

We believe that scaling Scholar Academies in DC will be an effective path to addressing the demand for LTPs in DC. Our investment will help Scholar Academies to develop an office in DC, and build its capacity to sustain both future turnarounds and start-up charter schools.

# Notes

**Slide 5:** “School Turnaround Strategies That Have Failed: How to avoid past mistakes in addressing the needs of low-performing schools,” Mass Insight Education and Research Institute (2010).

**Slide 6:** “The Turnaround Challenge: Why America’s best opportunity to dramatically improve student achievement lies in our worst-performing schools,” Mass Insight Education and Research Institute (2007).

**Slide 7-9:** “The Lead Partner: A new partnership model,” Mass Insight Education and Research Institute (2010).

**Slide 11:** Robert Manwaring, “Restructuring ‘Restructuring’: Improving Interventions for Low-Performing Schools and Districts,” Education Sector (2010); Chicago Public Schools Office of Performance, “AYP Status Overtime 2004 – 2009,” <http://research.cps.k12.il.us/cps/accountweb/Reports/allschools.html>; Pennsylvania Department of Education, “School AYP Status 2003-2010,” [http://www.education.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school\\_assessments/7442](http://www.education.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_assessments/7442); DC Office of the State Superintendent of Education, “District of Columbia Assessment and Accountability Data Reports – School AYP Lists,” <http://www.nclb.osse.dc.gov/schoolsSummaryReports.asp>.

**Slide 13:** Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2009-2010 PSSA and AYP Results – School Level, [http://www.education.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school\\_assessments/7442](http://www.education.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_assessments/7442); Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2006-2007 PSSA and AYP Results – School Level, School Totals, [http://www.education.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school\\_assessments/7442/2009 - 2010\\_pssa\\_and\\_ayp\\_results/770183](http://www.education.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_assessments/7442/2009_-_2010_pssa_and_ayp_results/770183); Chicago Public Schools Office of Performance, Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) Overtime, 2001-2010, <http://research.cps.k12.il.us/cps/accountweb/Reports/allschools.html>.

**Slide 14:** DC Office of the State Superintendent of Education, District of Columbia Assessment and Accountability Data Reports (2010 State Report Card, [http://www.nclb.osse.dc.gov/dccas\\_reportcards.asp](http://www.nclb.osse.dc.gov/dccas_reportcards.asp)); 2010 KIPP: KEY PCS Report Card, <http://www.nclb.osse.dc.gov/aypreports.asp>; Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2009-2010 PSSA and AYP Results – State Level, School Level, [http://www.education.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school\\_assessments/7442](http://www.education.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_assessments/7442); Chicago Public Schools Office of Performance, Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) Overtime, 2001-2010 (school data), <http://research.cps.k12.il.us/cps/accountweb/Reports/allschools.html>; Chicago Public Schools Office of Performance, Illinois Standards Achievement Test Over Time Report: All Subjects - All Grades Combined 2001-2010 (citywide data), <http://research.cps.k12.il.us/cps/accountweb/Reports/citywide.html>.

# Notes

- Slide 15:** “KIPP Report Card 2009,” [http://www.kipp.org/00/docs/KIPP\\_ReportCard\\_2009/KIPP\\_ReportCard2009\\_rev.pdf](http://www.kipp.org/00/docs/KIPP_ReportCard_2009/KIPP_ReportCard2009_rev.pdf);  
“Meeting the Turnaround Challenge, School Case Study: Mastery Charter School Organization, Pickett Charter Middle School, Philadelphia, PA,” Mass Insight Education and Research Institute (2009); “Mastery Charter Schools, 2008-2009 Overview” ([www.masterycharter.org](http://www.masterycharter.org)); “Meeting the Turnaround Challenge, School Case Study: Academy for Urban School Leadership, Harvard School of Excellence, Chicago, IL,” Mass Insight Education and Research Institute (2009).
- Slide 19:** “Meeting the Turnaround Challenge, School Case Study: Mastery Charter School Organization, Pickett Charter Middle School, Philadelphia, PA,” Mass Insight Education and Research Institute (2009); “Meeting the Turnaround Challenge, School Case Study, Appendix A: Mastery Staff Handbook,” Mass Insight Education and Research Institute (2009).
- Slide 20:** “Meeting the Turnaround Challenge, School Case Study: Academy for Urban School Leadership, Harvard School of Excellence, Chicago, IL,” Mass Insight Education and Research Institute (2009).
- Slide 28:** “School Turnaround Leaders: Competencies for Success,” Public Impact for the Chicago Public Education Fund (2008).
- Slide 30:** ReNEW Charter Management Organization – Organizational Charts ([www.renewschools.org](http://www.renewschools.org)); “Meeting the Turnaround Challenge, School Case Study: Mastery Charter School Organization, Pickett Charter Middle School, Philadelphia, PA,” Mass Insight Education and Research Institute (2009).
- Slide 37:** Friends of Choice in Urban Schools, “DC CAS 2010: Proficiency vs. Average Annual Growth,” [http://www.focusdc.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=436](http://www.focusdc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=436); DC Office of the State Superintendent of Education, “District of Columbia Assessment and Accountability Data Reports,” <http://www.nclb.osse.dc.gov/>.
- Slide 38:** DC Public Schools Office of the Chief Academic Officer, “Linguistically and Culturally Diverse Student Enrollment by School and English Language Proficiency Status” (2009). CityBridge calculations are based on publically available DC-CAS and enrollment data from the DC Office of the State Superintendent of Education.
- Slide 39:** “The Lead Partner: A new partnership model,” Mass Insight Education and Research Institute (2010). [http://www.massinsight.org/publications/stg-resources/108/file/1/pubs/2010/07/09/STG\\_Lead\\_Partner\\_master\\_deck\\_March\\_2010.pdf](http://www.massinsight.org/publications/stg-resources/108/file/1/pubs/2010/07/09/STG_Lead_Partner_master_deck_March_2010.pdf)
- Slide 41:** “Meeting the Turnaround Challenge, School Case Study: Academy for Urban School Leadership, Harvard School of Excellence, Chicago, IL,” Mass Insight Education and Research Institute (2009).